Post-quantum cryptography for digital assets

Find where your cryptography breaks before a quantum computer does.

Exchanges, custodians, fintechs and banks hold long-lived keys. Data encrypted today can be harvested now and decrypted later. Quantum Lightning inventories your cryptography, flags what Shor's algorithm can break, and delivers a migration plan to ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA.

Why now

Harvest now, decrypt later

Traffic and backups captured today can be decrypted once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. If you keep secrets for years, you need to act first.

Standards are out

NIST has published ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205). Regulators and large clients are starting to ask for migration plans.

Q-Day as a range, not a date

Our model shows arrival probabilities with cited sources. We never promise a date.

Public milestones of the transition

  1. 1994

    Peter Shor publishes the algorithm that factors integers and breaks RSA and ECC on a quantum computer.

  2. 2016

    NIST opens its competition to standardize post-quantum cryptography.

  3. 2024

    NIST publishes FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), 204 (ML-DSA) and 205 (SLH-DSA).

  4. 2030

    NIST proposal: 112-bit RSA and ECC become deprecated.

  5. 2035

    NIST proposal: RSA and ECC become disallowed.

2030 and 2035 come from a NIST draft proposal (IR 8547) and may change.

From assessment to migration plan

01

Exposed keys

We find public keys already revealed on-chain and in certificates — the first to fall to a quantum computer.

02

Shor-vulnerable crypto

We inventory RSA, ECDSA/ECDH, DH and Ed25519 across certificates, TLS, SSH and keys, with CBOM export (CycloneDX).

03

Q-Day estimate

A probabilistic model of when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer may arrive, shown as ranges with sources — never a date.

04

Migration Optimizer

A prioritized per-asset plan toward ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, matched to your risk and infrastructure.

How it works →

Test your domain now

See in seconds which key and key exchange your TLS server uses, and whether it is Shor-vulnerable.

Illustrative, limited check: it only inspects the certificate, not the negotiated key exchange or your internal infrastructure.

Three ways to start

Quantum Assessment

A one-time assessment of your cryptographic exposure.

  • Cryptographic inventory
  • Quantum risk report
  • CBOM (CycloneDX)
Request a proposal →

Assisted Migration

A post-quantum migration plan prioritized per asset.

  • Per-asset plan with priority and effort
  • PQC algorithm recommendations
  • Signed report
Request a proposal →

Continuous Monitoring

Ongoing tracking of your post-quantum posture.

  • Continuous scanning
  • Q-Day model updates
  • DefectDojo and CI integration
Request a proposal →

Pricing on request: we send a proposal tailored to your scope.

FAQ

Do quantum computers break cryptography today?

No. Current demonstrations, including ours on IBM Quantum hardware, are small and do not break real cryptography. The risk is harvest now, decrypt later.

Do you predict when Q-Day will happen?

No. We show probability ranges with cited sources, because nobody knows the date.

Do I have to replace everything at once?

No. The plan prioritizes long-lived secrets and already-exposed keys, and can use hybrid modes.

How much does it cost?

Pricing is on request and depends on scope. Ask for a proposal; a human reviews it before any figure.

Ready to see your quantum-risk map?

Get a preliminary proposal in minutes, reviewed by a human.